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ABSTRACT 
 
Minu, Startu and All That: Pitfalls in Estimating the 
Sensitivity of a Worker’s Wage to Aggregate Unemployment 
 
In this paper we show that panel estimates of tenure specific sensitivity to the business cycle 
of wages is subject to serious pitfalls. Three canonical variates used in the literature – the 
minimum unemployment rate during a worker’s time at the firm (min u), the unemployment 
rate at the start of her tenure (Su) and the current unemployment rate interacted with a new 
hire dummy (δu) – can all be significant and “correctly” signed even when each worker in the 
firm receives the same wage, regardless of tenure (equal treatment). In matched data the 
problem can be resolved by the inclusion in the panel of firm-year interaction dummies. In 
unmatched data where this is not possible, we propose a solution for min u and Su based on 
Solon, Barsky and Parker’s (1994) two step method. Our proposed solution method is 
however suboptimal because it removes a lot of potentially informative variation in average 
wages. Unfortunately δu cannot be identified in unmatched data because a differential wage 
response to unemployment of new hires and incumbents will appear under both equal 
treatment and unequal treatment. 
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1 Introduction and overview
There has been a recent upsurge in interest in the relationship between the tenure of a
worker and the sensitivity of her wages to the business cycle. Despite a burgeoning empirical
literature many issues in this area remain controversial. In particular arguments still persist
about the extent to which the wages of new hires are more sensitive to current business
cycle conditions than those of incumbents (See for example Baker,Gibbs and Holmstrom,
1994. who nd they are di¤erent and Gertler and Tregari, 2009 who nd they are not).More
generally, others have investigated the general relationship between a workers pay and the
state of the business cycle during her tenure with the rm. Establishing reliable empirical
stylised facts about these issues is crucial for macroeconomic theories of wage setting. A
popular way to investigate how the sensitivity of wages to the business cycle varies with a
workers tenure is the inclusion of tenure related cyclical variates in standard Mincer wage
equations. Three canonical examples of such variates are a) the minimum unemployment
rate during a workers tenure, "minu";b) the unemployment rate of a worker at the start of
his tenure, "Su",and c) the current unemployment rate interacted with a new hire dummy,
"u".1 Henceforth we refer to variates such as these as unemployment-tenure interactions
or UTIs for short. We argue in this paper that drawing inferences from the signicance of
UTI variates has serious pitfalls. In particular we show that they may be signicant and
"correctly" signed even when the wages of workers within a rm are equally sensitive to the
business cycle regardless of tenure. Referring to the latter situation as equal treatment -
our generic null hypothesis - we show analytically and numerically that under a a number
of plausible equal treatment models these three variates will be signicant with a sign that
would lead the investigator to nd falsely in favour of a model based on unequal treatment
contracts (forged via bilateral rm-worker bargaining) rather than equal treatment contracts
(usually but not necessarily forged via collective rm-workforce bargaining). The problem
- essentially one of endogenous tenure - arises because the average UTI for a rm embeds
information on its current and past hiring decisions which, under equal treatment, may be
correlated with that rms wage level. A solution to the problem is to include rm-year
interaction dummies.to absorb rm specic wage components. If this is done, UTI variates
will only be signicant if the sensitivity of wages to the business cycle actually does vary
with tenure - our generic alternative hypothesis. Unfortunately this cure is not always
available because many panel datasets do not match workers to rms, the PSID being a
classic case in point. We argue that without matched data it is impossible to identify
asymmetric responses to unemployment of wages of new hires and incumbents - the case we
are calling u here. However for minu and Su Solon,Barsky and Parkers(1994, henceforth
SBP) two step estimator may be adapted to control for the biases induced by the existence
1@u is not commonly used as a regressor directly in panel regressions although Gertler and Tregari (2009)s
estimates recently attracted some attention. It is more common to compare directly the properties of average
wages of new hires with incumbents - something we do in the nal section of this paper. Other examples
of UTIs are the maximum unemployment rate since joining the rm, the maximum change in unemploy-
ment since joining the rm (see Macis, 2009) and the product of a tenure measure and unemployment (see
Arozamena and Centen(2006). Extensions of the analysis to these ond other UTIs should be obvious.
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of common rm specic wage components. Using the panel dimension to control for worker
characteristics, SBP (and subsequently Shin and Shin, 2003 and Devereux and Hart, 2007)
extract composition bias.free estimates of mean wages for di¤erent worker tenures in each
time period. These data are then used to form a new time/tenure panel to investigate
the business cycle sensitivity of wages across di¤erent tenures. 2 We propose adding extra
regressors to SBPs second stage regression to annihilate the biases in UTI estimates caused
by equal treatment. However our proposed method is clearly inferior to adding rm-year
interaction dummies to the original panel. Not only does it remove much of the cross tenure
variation in wages but to work e¤ectively it also requires normalised covariances between
rm hiring and rm wages to be constant across the business cycle.We close the paper with
a small empirical illustration from the PSID. In the application negative estimates of UTI
e¤ects from the panel dimension change sign and become insignicant when we apply the
modied SBP method.
We emphasise at this point what this paper does not say. We do not argue that the
tenure related cyclical e¤ects found so far in the literature (in particular, the signicantly
negative coe¢ cients found on minu; Su and u) are necessarily spurious. Instead the paper
makes the important methodological point that UTIs may be spuriously signicant and
"correctly" signed. Furthermore it is quite likely that a large economy will be characterised
by bargaining practices that vary from sector to sector. Some sectors could be characterised
by equal treatment contracting whereas others could be characterised by unequal treatment
(see for example Kilponen and Santavirta, 2010, who nd variations in the importance of
di¤erent contract mechanisms across di¤erent sectors of the Finnish economy). If this is the
case, our results would also indicate that estimates of tenure specic cyclical e¤ects may be
biased rather than simply spurious. Whether or not this bias is upwards (towards zero) or
downwards will depend on the nature of rm level bargaining in the sectors that are subject to
equal treatment. For example in this paper we identify a number of equal treatment models
that generate spurious negative coe¢ cients on minu. Even if these types of models are only
relevant in a portion of the economy the coe¢ cient on minu will still be downward biased.
This would lead the investigator to an exaggerated view of the quantitative importance in
the economy as a whole of the contracting environment that minu was designed to test for.
Whilst it makes sense to focus this paper on equal treatment models capable of generating the
negative signs on UTIs that we see in the empirical literature, we acknowledge that negative
signs are not generic - other models will generate positive coe¢ cients on UTIs In such cases
an exactly converse argument could be invoked - namely that the quantitative importance of
the relevant unequal treatment contracting mechanism could be underestimated. Whatever
the case, it is essential in these empirical exercises to correct the biases to get an accurate
take on the quantitative importance (or not) of the relevant unequal treatment bargaining
mechanism that is being tested by the particular UTI.
2The method - asymptotically equivalent to panel estimation when weighted least squares is used in the
second step - was originally advanced to circumvent the large biases in standard errors that arise when the
RHS (macro) variables have variation that is only a tiny fraction of the dependent variable (wages) - see
Moulton(1990).
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Second, it is well known that any variate that is correlated with a workers tenure such
as minu3 will also be potentially correlated with wages if human capital accrues through
job experience. As pointed out by other authors, if tenure related human capital is not
adequately controlled for, variates such as minu could be signicant in Mincer equations
even in the absence of tenure specic business cycle e¤ects. The modus operandi of this
e¤ect, however, is completely di¤erent to ours and to emphasise this point we show UTIs
will be signicant even in the absence of tenure related human capital. Having said this,
tenure is nearly always included in Mincer equations and its inclusion will a¤ect the biases on
UTIs. To assess this, we examine the impact of adding tenure measures to Mincer equations
in numerical simulations at the end of the paper.
Thirdly and in a similar vein to the human capital argument, Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2010) argue that minu and Su are signicant because they proxy for unobserved match
quality in a market clearing model with on the job search. They propose new proxies for
match quality and argue that including these in a wage equation drives out the signicance
of minu and Su:Once again the modus operandi of their e¤ect is completely di¤erent to ours
and our results obtain in a world without unobservable match quality. Furthermore, in 4.6
below we argue that two of Hagedorn and Manovskiis newly proposed match quality proxies
may themselves be spuriously signicant in models of equal treatment even where workers
always have identical match productivity and labour markets do not necessarily clear. In
our paper, the potential spurious signicance of tenure related cyclical variates is generated
by the cross sectional correlation of rm wages with rm hiring decisions rather than via
di¤erences in human capital or match quality across workers.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 overviews the literature - theoretical and
empirical - of wage setting in relation to the business cycle. Emphasis here is on the distinc-
tion between models that are founded on unequal treatment versus those founded on equal
treatment. The former are necessarily founded on rm-worker bilateral bargaining whilst
the latter are often - but not always - founded on rm-workforce collective bargaining. In
section 3 we expose the main point made by the paper via a simple illustrative model. In
section 4 we derive the properties of (pooled) panel regression estimates of UTIs under a
generic alternative hypothesis of equal treatment within the rm. In this section we sharpen
the main ndings by assuming that wages and employment depend only on rm specic
idiosyncratic shocks and hence display no aggregate business cycle. To avoid singularity of
some of the regressions we assume that aggregate labour supply and hence the aggregate
unemployment rate are variable. Despite the absence of a business cycle in aggregate wages
and employment, estimated UTI coe¢ cients are asymptotically nonzero and often take the
expected negative sign. Also in this section we o¤er a digression which suggests that Hage-
dorn and Manowskiis match quality proxies may themselves be spuriously signicant under
equal treatment models where match quality is completely absent and where markets do not
necessarily clear. In Section 5 we run simulations to quantify the estimated spurious e¤ects
in the more realistic setting of both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We nd that under
3It is easy to show (we do so below) that variates like minu can be re-written as a linear combination of
tenure dummies.
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several plausible parameter scenarios in two equal treatment models, the UTI estimates have
a similar order of magnitude to those found in the empirical literature. Section 6 discusses
SBPs method and its extensions used by Devereux and Hart(2007) .We show that these
methods do not eliminate the problem. However if scaled cross sectional wage-employment
covariances are acyclical, time t averages of composition-free wages can be used to obtain
estimates of UTIs that are zero under the null of equal treatment and consistent under the
alternative. A small empirical application to the PSID in this section shows that apply-
ing our method reverses the initially "correct" signs of initial panel based UTI coe¢ cient
estimates.
2 Models of wage formation and the business cycle
Much of the current theoretical macro literature on wage formation focuses on models where
individual workers bargain with a rm bilaterally and independently of existing contracts
that exist within that rm. Classic and vintage examples of these bilateral contracting mod-
els are the implicit contract models of Beaudry and Dinardo (1991 - henceforth BDN) and a
host of search theoretic models that grew (and are growing) out of Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) seminal paper (e.g. Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006)4 In these models wages at
time t are a¤ected by the state of the economy (or more specically the level of rm labour
productivity) at the time of entry into the rm and may also depend on the state of the
economy subsequent to that date. Hence the current level of an individuals wages is deter-
mined by the state of the business cycle - usually measured as the aggregate unemployment
rate - at the start of and during his tenure.
There is, however, another class of contracting models where, for a given level of human
capital be it rm or worker specic, each worker within the rm is paid the same wage. In
these "equal treatment" models the wage may vary over the business cycle, but crucially is
independent of a workers tenure (again, modulo human capital). These models imply equal
treatment in the sense that no matter how bad(good) current economic conditions are, new
workers are not o¤ered lower (higher) wages than incumbents. Classic and vintage examples
are the e¢ ciency wage models of Shapiro and Stiglitz(1984) and its variants and insider-
outsider models such as that of Blanchard and Summers(1986). More recent examples are
search theoretic models with a) staggered contracting (Gertler and Trigari, 2009), b) wage
norms (Hall, 2005), c) bargaining over the marginal surplus under diminishing returns to
labour (Elsby, 2010) and d) market clearing but with idiosyncratic unobserved match quality
(Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2010). Finally the contracting models of Snell and Thomas(2010)
4In most of these models, constant returns to scale implies that the economy contains "jobs" not "rms".
To take the models to the data where rms obviously do exist requires us to think of each rm as housing a
number of jobs each with a wage determined by the bilateral bargain struck between the worker and the rm
at the time of the jobs inception. With rms so dened, the model predicts wage dispersion within rms
even across workers of identical human capital.. Under equal treatment, however, wage dispersion within
the rm can only occur via di¤erences in human capital something that we abstract from in this paper.
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and Martins, Snell and Thomas(2005,2010) build in equal treatment within the rm at the
outset.
Whilst many of the bilateral contract models are assessed via their abilities to reproduce
the salient moments of the relevant macro data (such as employment,wage and vacancy
variability over the business cycle) companion empirical work tests the theory at hand by
examining the signicance of some tenure specic cyclical variable, typically a UTI.such as
minu. Signicance of these variates when they are included in standard panel wage (Mincer)
equations is construed as being supportive of both unequal treatment and of the particular
type of bargaining that the variate was designed to capture. For example in one version of
BDNs bilateral contract model, wages of new hires are synchronised with the state of the
cycle at the time of joining the rm but because workers are mobile, wages must rise as the
labour markets tighten in order to retain the worker. By contrast when the labour market
slackens, the insurance implicit in the contract prevents workerswages from falling. In an
extension to their basic model (where they add an alternative to formal employment that
displays aggregate diminishing returns), BDN show that the minimum unemployment rate
since the worker joined the rm or "minu" for short is a su¢ cient statistic for his wages. The
signicance of minu in their empirics therefore, is taken as evidence against equal treatment
and in favour of the specic form of bilateral bargaining embodied in their model. Another
variant of the BDN model assumes worker commitment via costly labour mobility. In this
world it is unemployment at the start of tenure that determines the workers wage so that Su
and not minu is the relevant variate. They also test a spot market model whereby u itself
(the current unemployment rate) is the only relevant variable.Using data from the CPS and
PSID they nd minu dominates both Su and u. Subsequent empirical papers by Mcdonald
and Worswick(1999) and Grant(2003) have found similar results with minu being by far the
most robustly signicant and correctly (negatively) signed of the three.
In a similar vein adherents of the Mortensen and Pissarides (henceforth MP) mod-
elling approach measure the extent to which wages of new hires and incumbents di¤er-
entially respond to current economic conditions. Adding u and u (unemployment and an
unemployment-new hire dummy interaction term) to a wage equation would help establish
the extent of (if any) the di¤erential response of new hire versus incumbent wages to cur-
rent economic conditions. Finding such a di¤erential would provide support for the bilateral
contracting in the model. It would also aid the calibration of the model by quantifying
the sensitivity of the bargained wage to current economic conditions (the workers outside
option). Gertler and Trigari (2009).extend the Mortensen and Pissarides model to allow for
staggered contracts but they assume that devising new contracts for new hires incurs costs so
that all wages within the rm are adjusted together - in short they assume equal treatment.
In their companion empirical work they add u and @u.to a standard Mincer equation and
nd that after controlling for spell xed e¤ects @u is insignicant. They conclude that the
wages of new hires have the same exposure to the business cycle as do those of incumbents.
Further examples of papers that include UTIs in Mincer equations include:- Montuenga,
Garcia and Fernandez(2006), who addminu to an otherwise standard wage curve for a group
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of EU countries, Schmieder and von Wachter (2010), who extend BDNs analysis to test for
equality of minu coe¢ cients between two consecutive work spells,.Hartog, Opstal and Teul-
ings(1997), who use UTIs to analyse inter industry wage di¤erentials, Bertrand(2004) and
Kilponen and Santavirta (2010) who use UTIs to assess the e¤ects on wages of import com-
petition, Arozamena and Centeno(2006) who interact unemployment with a tenure measure
to allow for cyclicality to vary with tenure, Vilhubert(1999) who uses UTIs to assess wage
exibility in Germany and Bell, Nickell and Quintini(2000) who add UTIs to an otherwise
standard wage curve. Authors using SBPmethod to estimate the importance of UTIs
include Shin and Shin (2003) and Devereux and Hart(2007).
3 A simple illustrative model
In this section we x ideas and intuition for our main results by analysing a simple equal
treatment model. In keeping with the analytical results in the rst half of this paper we
work with one cross section at time t and abstract from the business cycle by assuming that
all shocks to wages and employment are rm specic and idiosyncratic. Whilst this implies
that average rm wages and employment are constant it leaves unspecied the time series
properties of labour supply and hence of aggregate unemployment. 5
In practice it would be foolish to try and identify the e¤ect of the business cycle on wages
using a single cross section and it would be impossible to do so when no business cycle is
present. But attempting to do so illustrates our main point:- even in a world with no business
cycle and where there is equal treatment we may still get signicant UTI estimates. The
modus operandi of the e¤ect we identify in this paper is that the signicance of the coe¢ cient
on the UTI arises from cross sectional (more specically cross-rm) wage variation rather
than from its time series correlation with current and past levels of unemployment. Later in
the paper we show - again in the absence of a business cycle - that the results on the signs
of biases from a single cross section extend to those obtained from a full panel.
We build this example around two key stylised facts of labour markets, namely that,
controlling for rm and worker characteristics, larger rms pay more and have higher labour
retention rates (lower turnover).6 Explicitly we have "low" and "high" rms. Low (high)
rms have low(high) wages and low(high) retention rates. Whilst rm size is irrelevant to the
model, it would be natural to think of the high wage rms as being large and low rms.being
5Note that the orthogonal complement of @0ijtut namely (1  @0ijt)ut or the unemployment rate (ut) itself
should also be included in order to be able to assess di¤erential e¤ects of the business cycle on new hires.
It is easy to show that in the absence of business cycles - the initial scenario under which we operate - that
omitting either term is innocuous. And of course in the single cross section we have here ut is absorbed into
the intercept.
6Lallemand et al (2003) estimate that in some EU countries a doubling of rm size - ceteris paribus -
raises wages by around 5% and in the Survey of Consumer Finances, rms with <100 employees have an
average turnover rate greater than 40% whilst for those with more than 100 employees the average rate is
around 20% (Even and Macpherson,1996).
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small. We analytically determine the signs of the three UTI coe¢ cients and calibrate the
model to get numerical values for them.
Suppose that a rm either pays high wages (wijt = wh) or low wages (wijt = wl) and
that proportion ph(pl) of time ts labour force work in high(low) wage rms. High rms are
assumed to have retention rate sh which exceeds the rate for low rms (sl).
To derive a form for the UTI coe¢ cient for minu (b minu) we could simply treat the
group of rms paying high wages (and having low labour turnover) as a single high wage
"rm".and do likewise for the low wage sector. Employment in both sectors (Lh and Ll) is
assumed to be constant and this makes the tenure structure very simple. For the two sectors
(indexed by i = h and i = l) the number of tenure k workers surviving at time t (Li(k)t ) is
just
L
i(k)
t = s
k
i (L
i
t k   siLit k 1)
= ski f(1  si)Lig i = h; l
Each worker of tenure k at time t will have the same minu.value so the average minu in
the high wage sector (mht ) and in the low wage sector (m
l
t) is
mit =
( 1X
k=0
ski (L
i
t k   siLit k 1)umt k
)
=Lit
= (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski u
m
t k i = h; l (1)
Note that by replacing umt k with ut k we get an exact formula for the Su case and we
denote this as Sht (S
l
t) for high(low) wage rms.
We can rewrite the expression for mit more informatively as
mit = ut  
1X
k=1
ski (u
m
t k+1   umt k) i = h; l
In this last expression, the term in braces is always weakly positive and because sl < sh
it follows that mht < m
l
t
Using some tedious OLS arithmetic we can now show that the three coe¢ cient estimates
for our UTIs are
8
bu = pf(1  sh) + (1  slp)gfsh + slpgutf(sh   sl)(wl   wh)gbminu = phpl(mht  mlt)(wht   wlt)
phm
h(2)
t + p
lm
l(2)
t   (phmht + plmlt)2
where m
i(2)
t = (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski (u
m
t k)
2 i = l; h
bSu = phpl(Sht   Slt)(wht   wlt)
phS
h(2)
t + p
lS
l(2)
t   (phSht + plSlt)2
where Sit = (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski ut k i = l; h
S
i(2)
t = (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski u
2
t k i = l; h
Because sl < sh and mht < m
l
t both bu and bminu are negative.for any sequence of reali-
sations of aggregate unemployment ut; ut 1; ut 2::: The sign of (Sht  Slt) will however depend
on the realisations for aggregate unemployment so the sign of bSu cannot be determined.
To get a feel for numerical values we might expect from a cross section estimation 7we
conduct a simple and crude calibration exercise based on data from the US economy. Below
are data from the US Census Bureau on private sector employment by rm size.
FirmSize 1  4 5  9 10  19 20  99 100  499 5000  9999
Employees(m) 5:8 6:9 8:5 20:6 16:8 6:4
500  749 750  999 1000  1499 1500  2499 2500  4999 10000+
3:5 2:3 3:4 4:4 6:0 30:5
Using this data to rank employees by the size of the rm that they work in then the
median workers rm size is about 300 employees. Following on from above, we could label
those workers working in rms of less than 300 employees "l" type and those above as "h"
type. In this case, pl = ph = :5. Assuming a wage size premium elasticity of 5% 8 then,
if the above rm size distribution applied for regardless of worker skill and industry sector,
the wage premium for the above model i.e. wht   wlt would be about 40%. We set sl and
sh equal to :6 and :8 respectively. If our reference points are the average rm size for "l"
7It is easy to show that in our acyclical world estimates from the full panel are a (positive) weighted
average of the cross sectional estimates.
8Studies by Lallemand, et.al (2003) for European economies and by Oi and Idson (1999) nd elasticities
in the range 0 to 10% with an average estimate near to 5%.
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and "h" category workers respectively, :6 and :8 are roughly consistent with the 1988-91
NLSY data in Even and Macpherson,(1996). Finally to calibrate Sit ; S
i(2)
t ;m
i
t and m
i(2)
t we
use the realisations of annual US unemployment since 1948.and set ut in the u formula
to 5%. These calibrated values give estimates of bminu,bu and bSu of  9:98; 2:14; and
 :78 respectively. The value for minu is higher than those found in the literature by BDN,
and others where the average estimate is around  5:0 but the numbers for Su and u are
a similar order of magnitude to estimates found in empirical work. Whilst the model and
its calibration represent a rather crude caricature of the salient stylised facts of US labour
markets, the exercise does at least show that the e¤ect we identify in this paper is potentially
quantitatively important.
The above shows that even in the absence of a business cycle, the three UTIs will be
signicant in panels and may have negative sign. It is easy to show that adding worker xed
e¤ects does not cure the problem. By contrast adding rm xed e¤ects will x the problem. It
will annihilate the problematic rm specic wage components and yield consistent estimates
of the 0s.9. However in a more general stochastic model rm wages and employment would
be subject to rm specic and aggregate shocks (as in sections 5 and 6 below). In that
scenario rm xed e¤ects would no longer remove rm specic wage components. Instead
we would need rm-year interaction dummies to remove these components.
4 Estimates of UTI e¤ects under equal treatment
In this section we expose analytically the behaviour of estimates of our three UTI variates
under equal treatment within the rm. We derive our results under a single xed economy
wide retention10 rate to allow us to obtain closed form solutions for estimates etc. The
formulae are easily adapted to allow for m possible retention rates (si; i = 1; 2::m) by group-
ing the rms into sectors each of which corresponds to a xed s value.We do this for the
simple case of m = 2 i.e. an economy with high and low s sectors with the high s sector
having a high mean wage and high mean employment and vice versa for the low s sector.
In this analysis it is important that the designation is xed over time and independent of
the shocks.that impinge on rms. This is consistent with a world where shocks that a¤ect
employment and wages in high and low rms are temporary and small relative to the dif-
ference in mean wages and mean employment between high and low rms. Hence, despite
su¤ering idiosyncratic shocks over time, large high wage/high retention rate rms do not
become small, low wage/low retention rate rms and vice versa.11
9Under the alternative where wages are linear in each respective UTI, adding rm xed e¤ects is innocuous.
10In this paper we prefer to deal with worker retention rates rather than labour turnover rates. The latter
is of course one minus the former.
11The literature on the wage size premium focuses on both di¤erences in plant and rm size. Obviously
over a long period of time, both plant size and rm size can grow in size. So our xed assignation of rms
into small and large size is consistent with the relatively small T assumption of the paper.
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The main aim in this section is to establish conditions on the cross section covariance of
rm/sector wages and rm/sector employment under which these estimates have a non zero
and negative probability limit. The plan is to start by analysing a single cross section and
then to establish results for the full panel afterwards. As noted above we sharpen and simplify
our analytical results by abstracting from a business cycle - all shocks are idosyncratic rather
than aggregate. The e¤ects of allowing for a business cycle in wages and employment are
considered via numerical simulations in section 5.
We assume we have a complete sample of workers in n rms which constitute the economy.
Of course few datasets will be anything like this comprehensive (although the QP from
Portugal approaches this). In subsection 4.8, we discuss the e¤ects of random sampling of
only proportion p of the workforce in the economy.and show that although this complicates
the analytical details it does not change the central results.as long as the number of rms
being sampled is large. As stressed above this paper abstracts from human capital. Our
equal treatment hypothesis is that workers within a rm receive the same wage.up to an
(worker specic) idiosyncratic shock.12. Finally we assume that the retention rate in each
rm is exogenous and is su¢ ciently low to avoid the rm having to make layo¤s. Allowing
for layo¤s would introduce nonlinearities which would seriously confound the analysis.but
we do not believe it is central to our results.13
4.1 OLS estimates of  in a single cross section under equal treat-
ment
In what follows we consider the regression of wages on (an intercept and) a single UTI - hence
we deal with each of our three UTIs separately and in turn. The global aim is to derive
results for full (pooled) panel estimation over time periods t = 1; :::T; rms j = 1; ::n14 and
individuals i = 1:::Ljt within those rms.but as noted above our no business cycle assumption
allows us to deal with a single cross section for the current purpose. We therefore estimate
for a single time period t
wijt = + cijt + errorijt (2)
where wijt is log of wages of individual i in rm j at t and cijt and errorijt are that
individuals UTI cyclical variable and error (both to be specied) respectively.
12This may be measurement error and were we to ease our assumptions to allow for "idiosyncratic" (i.e.
uncorrelated across workers and uncorrelated with tenure and macro variates) human capital, it could be
that also.
13We should note that the average rate of annual rm level labour force turnover in the US is high -
about 30% - although we admit that not all of this will be due to worker quits. One way of defending our
assumption of no layo¤s is by saying that the results only apply in data where adverse shocks to the rm
are not too severe.
14Here n is assumed to be xed across time but this is merely a notational simplication. The analysis
whereby n is time subscripted would merely require the additional assumption that min(n1; n2::nT )  > 1
for the asymptotics to carry through.
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We focus on three specic cases for c namely the aggregate unemployment rate times a
new hire dummy, cijt = @0ijtut ("u") the minimum aggregate unemployment rate seen by
worker i at time t since he/she joined rm j, cijt = minuijt; ("minu") and the aggregate
unemployment rate at the start of worker i0s tenure at rm j, cijt = Suijt.("Su"): It should
become clear that the analysis could be extended quite easily to other UTI variates.such as
"maxu" the maximum unemployment rate since a worker joined the rm (relevant where
there is one-sided (worker) commitment). A signicantly negative estimate of  is typically
interpreted by the investigator as support for the existence of the relevant form of bilateral
contracting.
Of course (2) is not a proper regression equation.but is merely a statement of what the
investigator is estimating. Suppose now that (2) is in fact a mispecication in the sense that
wijt is not directly related to cijt. Instead wages are equal to a rm specic component plus
worker specic shock i.e.
wijt = wjt + vijt (3)
E(vijt;cijt) = 0 E(vijt;wijt) = 0 (4)
This equation makes clear what we mean by equal treatment - di¤erences in wages may
exist but these di¤erences must not be correlated with UTIs. In adopting (2) we have
ignored education and worker tenure as regressors.whilst in the literature they are typically
included. Excluding the former is innocuous in the absence of human capital but excluding
worker tenure.is not - tenure is manifestly correlated with cijt and adding it to the regression
will change the estimates of the UTI parameters. The e¤ect of adding tenure to the regression
in (2) is taken up in the numerical simulations in section 5 below.
The regression estimate  for a single cross section of Lt workers is
b = 1
svar(cijt)
(scov(wijt; cijt)) (5)
where scov(:) and svar(:) are sample covariance and variance respectively. Later, we
extend the results to a panel where T the number of time periods is xed and small relative
to the number of rms.n:With this in mind we now analyse the sign of b as n goes to innity.
The denominator in (5) is always positive so we can focus exclusively on the sign of the
numerator.
Proposition 1:- The numerator in (5) can be written as
scov(wijt; cijt) =
1
Lt
 
scovf (wjt; cjt)  scovf (Ljt; wjt): 1
Lt
nX
j=1
cjt
!
+ op(1) (6)
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where scovf denotes sample covariance across rms j = 1; 2:::n at time t:rather than
across individuals and where, in the absence of aggregate shocks to rm employment,
p limLt = L is constant over time.
Proof: - See appendix
Equation (6) is important. It shows us that under an alternative hypothesis of equal
treatment where wages and employment are acyclical, bminu; bSu and bu will in general not
be zero and will take values that depend on the cross rm covariance of wages (wjt) with the
sum of the UTI values of workers in the rm (cjt). The latter will be a weighted average of
current and past employment levels of the rm where the weights are identical across rms.
For example in the case of u and where the rate of labour turnover 1   s is xed across
rms, cjt will be just (Ljt sLjt 1)ut.Therefore, in models where the rms wage policy (wjt)
depends on current and past labour force levels, the cross rm correlation of wjt and cjt will
in general be nonzero even though u is by assumption irrelevant to the wage policies of
rms.
We develop further the above expressions for specic choices of cijt namely, minu, Su
and @u. We then discuss the signs of the probability limits of the respective regression
coe¢ cients (bminu; bSu and bu):in an economy that has rms with identical mean wages,
mean employment and retention rates. We then extend the results on sign to cases of
heterogenous mean employment, mean wages and retention rates.
4.2 Minimum unemployment rate during tenure:- minu
We start by developing expressions for cjt = minujt (the "aggregate" minu within rm j).
The cijt variate for the minu case is a tenure dummy for worker i multiplied by the
minimum unemployment rate associated with her length of tenure. The sum of within-rm
tenure dummies for any entry date k is
@kjt =
LtX
i=1
@kijt  Ltjt k   Ltjt k 1 (7)
where @kijt = 1 if worker i is of tenure k and @
k
ijt = 0 if not. The "aggregate" minu within
a rm (minujt) will be related to past hiring and the cohort composition of the current
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labour force as follows
minujt
0@= LjtX
i=1
minuijt
1A = 1X
k=0
@kjtu
m
t k =
1X
k=0
(Ltjt k   Ltjt k 1)umt k (8)
=
1X
k=0
sk(Ljt k   sLjt k 1)umt k (9)
Following the lead of the analysis in section 3 above we can collect terms di¤erently to
get a di¤erent and more useful form for this expression as
minujt = Ljtut  
1X
k=1
skLjt k(umt k+1   umt k) (10)
Summing across rms and dividing by the number of workers Lt gives the time t average
minu as
1
Lt
nX
j=1
minujt = ut   1
Lt
1X
k=1
nX
j=1
skLjt k(umt k+1   umt k) (11)
= ut  
1X
k=1
sk
Lt k
Lt
(umt k+1   umt k) (12)
Setting cjt = minujt in (6) and then using (10) and (12) in (6) gives a value for p lim b
for the minu case as
p lim bminu /   1X
k=1
sk(k   0)(umt k+1   umt k) (13)
where k = p lim scovf (Ljt k; wjt) which - in keeping with the assumption of acyclical
rm employment and rm wages - is assumed to be time invariant and where we have used
the fact that in the absence of aggregate shocks p lim Lt k
Lt
= 1. Here and henceforth the
symbol / means "positively proportional to".
It may be more convenient sometimes to deal with the log of employment rather than
its level. Many models of the labour market do so. It would be useful then to derive an
analogue to (13) for covariances of logs. If (log) wages and rm employment are normally
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distributed 15 with time invariant unconditional means and variances then cov(wjt; Ljt k) =
c+cov(wjt; ljt k).where c+ > 0 and is independent of k. Using this (13) becomes
p lim bminu /   1X
k=1
skfk   0g(umt k+1   umt k) (14)
where k = cov(ljt k; wjt). k = 0; 1; 2;
Now note that umt k+1   umt k is always by denition non negative. We can see from (13)
therefore that if 0 is always negative and if it is also larger than or equal in absolute value to
k (for k = 1; 2; ::), then bminu will be negative. If the k (k > 0) are all weakly positive then
all we need is that 0 be negative. By contrast if 0 and k are both positive then p lim bminu
is only guaranteed to be negative if k > 0 for all k > 0; something that is unlikely to be
true.in practice or that is unlikely to be a theoretical property of a model. However, given
that s is below unity then the lead term may well dominate the sum in (13) or (14). In that
case we would require just 1 > 0. We could repeat these arguments for (14) and develop
identical conditions for k in place of k.to determine the sign of p lim bminu
4.3 Unemployment rate at start of tenure:- Su
For Su we could repeat the analytical steps used forminu but replacing terms in umt k+1 umt k
in (13) and (14) with ut k+1   ut k. This gives the analogue form of (13) and (14) as
p lim bSu /   1X
k=1
sk(k   0)(ut k+1   ut k) (15)
p lim bSu /   1X
k=1
skfk   0g(ut k+1   ut k) (16)
Whereas umt k+1 umt k in (13) and (14) is always positive, the sign of ut k+1 ut k cannot
be determined so we cannot say anything denitive about the sign of bSu.It is important to
note however that, for any given realisation of the unemployment rate sequence; p lim bSu is
non zero16
15Of course employment has bounded support so technically speaking it can only be approximately nor-
mally distributed.
16It is possible that when we evaluate its unconditional mean, i.e.
1R
0
:::
1R
0
p lim bStartuf(u1; :::ut)du1du2::dut.
that this quantity could be zero. But for any particular realisation of the unemployment sequence it will be
non zero and of course it remains nonzero asymptotically as n  >1.
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4.4 Unemployment rate sensitivity of new hires:- @u
Setting cijt = @ijtut in (6) above and using cjt =
LjtX
i=1
@ijtut = ut(Ljt  sLjt 1) in (6) gives the
analogues to (13) and (14) as
p lim bu /  (s1   0)ut (17)
p lim bu /  (s1   0)ut (18)
If 0 is negative and 1 is either relatively small in absolute value or is positive then bu
will have a negative probability limit. Once again these conditions apply to 0 and 

1 . By
contrast if 0 and 1 are both positive and 1 > 0 than bu will have a negative probability
limit.
We now examine the implications for the signs of the estimates if there is heterogeneity
across rms in mean employment, wages and retention rates.
4.5 Heterogenous mean wages, mean rm employment and reten-
tion rates
Some of the theoretical equal treatment models considered in MSTa and here generate a
negative cross rm covariance between wages and size and as noted above this is in conict
with the wage size premium. In addition and again as noted above, smaller, lower wage rms
tend to have lower retention rates. Here we extend the formulae for scov(wijt; cijt) given in
(6) above to allow for 2 sectors each containing ni i = h; l rms with, respectively, retention
rates si, average rm wages wit and average rm employment L
i
t.
17We also assume that nl
and nh  >1 with n.These two sectors are assumed to be separate subeconomies within a
larger economy and under the assumption of no business cycle in wages and employment (no
aggregate shocks) for large n;their mean rm wage and rm employment, wi and L
i
.will be
xed over time. To match the empirical regularities on s; w and L we assume that sl < sh.
Again whilst we do not require L
l
< L
h
we could envisage this to be the case in order to be
consistent with a positive cross-sector size-wage premium.
In this scenario scov(wijt; cijt) becomes
17Note that the results we derive here readily extend to the m > 2 case - a proof of this is available on
request.
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scov(wijt; cijt) = p
lscovl(wijt; cijt)+p
hscovh(wijt; cijt)+p
l(wli wt)(cl ct)+ph(whi wt)(ch ct)
(19)
where scovi(:) denotes a sample covariance measured over the subsample of workers in
sector i and where pi is the proportion of the labour force in sector r at time t:
As before we can talk unambiguously of small, low wage, low s rms, and large high
wage high s rms and use annotations land h respectively. Noting that p lim(Lit k=L
i
t) = 1
for i = l; h when n is large and following the analysis in section 3 (and in particular (1)),
the time t average UTIs cit for each of the three cases are
p lim u
i
t = (1  si)ut i = h; l
p limmit = (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski u
m
t k i = h; l
p limS
i
t = (1  si)
1X
k=0
ski ut k i = h; l
respectively. Again following section 3 above, we see that p lim u
l
t < p lim u
h
t and that
p limmlt < p limm
h
t independently of L
l
; L
h
. Using this and the fact that wl < wh, the last
two terms in (19) have a negative probability limit for the minu and u.cases. Hence a
su¢ cient condition for p lim scov(wijt; cijt) to be negative in the minu and u cases is that
p lim scovi(wijt; cijt) for i = l; h.. also be negative. Therefore, if wages and employment in
the high and low subeconomies are driven by the same economic model (albeit with di¤erent
mean rm wages and employment) then we need only analyse the sign of p lim scov(wijt; cijt)
for that economic model to determine the sign of bminu and bu. For Su however, these
su¢ cient conditions do not apply:- even if we can determine the sign of p lim scovi(wijt; cijt)
in (19) we cannot determine the sign of the second.term.
In a companion paper, (Martins, Snell and Thomas, 2011 - henceforth MSTa) analyse a
number of theoretical models of rm and sector wage/employment determination, including
static and dynamic multisectoral competitive models and a model of rm (labour market)
monopsony subject to dynamic labour adjustment.costs. In each case, we show that when
parameters lie in a region suggested by the relevant empirical studies, the conditions for
negativity of p lim bu and p lim bminu given at the end of sections 4.2 and 4.4 are satised.
Under some calibrations, some of the models exhibit a negative wage size premium - in con-
tradiction to the evidence. However by bolting on the high and low subeconomy structure
outlined in this subsection and by allowing di¤erent intercepts (the parameters that deter-
mine mean wages and employment) in the two subeconomies, the models can be engineered
to exhibit any desired wage size premium. We apply the high/low subeconomy structure
below to one of the two models we simulate in section 5.
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4.6 A digression:- Hagedorn andManovskiis qHM and qEH variates
Hagedorn and Manovskii(2010 - henceforth HM) describe a search environment where work-
erswages in a job are equal to a common cyclical wage (as would be the case under a simple
market clearing model without search) plus an idiosyncratic rm specic match component.
The latter is the workersunobserved rm specic human capital. HM argue that minu and
Su are signicant in Mincer regressions because they proxy for this unobserved match quality.
They show that the expected number of job o¤ers a worker receives during his working spell
(a spell during which employment is continuous, in which the worker switches rms only in
response to higher o¤ers and which is terminated when he is laid o¤) helps explain the wage
in that work spell. In the version of their model with exogenous separations they develop two
variables that act as proxies for the human capital component of a workers wage. Dening
labour market tightness t as the ratio of aggregate vacancies to the unemployment rate,
these two variates are qHM , the sum of 0s during the current job spell and qEH the sum of
0s during the work spell up to the point the job started. HM argue that the signicance
of minu and Su does not necessarily support the respective rigid wage contracting models
they were designed to test because these variates are also signicant under HMs ex wage
market clearing world. At rst glance this appears to be similar to the point of our paper,
namely to show that minu and Su may be signicant and "correctly" signed under polar
opposite conditions (i.e, equal treatment) to those which motivated the respective variates
construction. However this is misleading. Our e¤ect arises not because the variates minu
and Su proxy for the human capital elements of wages (as in HM) but because they are cor-
related with rm level wage and employment policies. Furthermore, because HMs variates
are - like minu and Su - partly constructed from tenure dummies that are correlated with
a rms wage and hiring policy under an equal treatment model with homogenous workers,
they too may be spuriously signicant under such alternative models. If this was the case
HMs variates would su¤er the same fate as minu,etc in that their signicance does not nec-
essarily support HMs ex wage spot market model.but instead could arise under one of the
rigid wage equal treatment alternatives considered in this paper. To illustrate this idea, we
take a closer look at qHM and qEH under an equal treatment model market clearing model
with identical workers.
The equal treatment models we consider in this paper do not say anything about the
vacancy rate  - it does not feature in them at all. However, below we derive all of our
analytical results for panels under the absence of a business cycle.in aggregate wages and
employment. Following this line for t we specify it as a constant  (say). Again this will
make our results stark by showing that apparently signicant estimates of qHM and qEH
obtain even when  is constant. This will show clearly that it is endogenous tenure not
unobserved human capital that is at work here.
To follow HM to the letter we should examine the joint behaviour of qHM and qEH in a
wage regression. But to keep things simple and tractable we consider their probability limits
as single regressors separately. In MSTa we show under our assumption of constant  and
using tedious derivation that
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p lim bqHM / 
p limLt
1X
k=0
sk(k +
1
1  s) (k   sk+1) 

p limLt
0
1 + s
1  s
where we assume p lim fk = k independent of t:
If the data are generated by an equal treatment model whereby a rms (or a sectors)
wage covaries with its labour force, then bqHM will be nonzero even in the absence of a busi-
ness cycle and without human capital. If we further suppose that the covariance between
a rms (sectors) wages and its current labour force is negative (i.e. 0 < 0) whilst covari-
ances between its lagged labour force and it wages are zero (i.e. k = 0 k = 1; 2; 3::).then
p lim bqHM is positively proportional to  s1 s0 and is hence positive. In MSTa we present
some models which have covariances with this property. By contrast if 0 and 1 are positive
with k = 0 for k > 1 and where 1 >
0
1 s then p lim
bqHM is positive. Again MSTa present
dynamic models capable of generating covariances with this property.(although we would
never argue the property was generic).
For qEH things are more tricky. This requires data on the length of the current job spell
when a worker joined the rm and this is not a variable that enters the models in our paper
or MSTa. Furthermore and unlike labour market tightness, abstracting from the business
cycle does not help much. Even without cyclical variation in wages and employment, there
could be systematic time variation in the average length of measured job spells across time.
Denoting tjk as the average job spell length on joining rm j of workers of tenure k, the
formula for bqEH is a simple adaptation of the formula for Su (15) and is given as
bqEH /   1X
k=1
sk(k   0)(tjk 1   tjk)
Without knowing the sign of (tjk 1   tjk) we cannot determine the sign of bqEH . but it
will in general be non zero.
In sum it is possible that HMs qHM and qEH be signicant and "correctly" (positively)
signed even tough the true world is radically di¤erent to the one they specify namely, a world
without human capital or a business cycle in either wages, employment or unemployment.
4.7 Pooled estimation on a full panel dataset
We now show how the above results for b carry over from a single cross section (single time
period) to a full panel. We take the absence of a business cycle in rm employment and
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wages to imply that for a worker i in rm j
wijt = f(fjt) and Ljt = f(fjt) (20)
where fjt is a vector of rm specic idiosyncratic shocks with time invariant pdfs.
Proposition 2:-
if p limfscov(wijt; cijt)g < 0 t = 1; ::T then (21)
p limfscovp(wijt; cijt)g < 0 (22)
where scovp(:) denotes a sample covariance derived from a panel and scov(:) denotes one
taken from a single cross section.
Proof:- See appendix
In the absence of aggregate shocks to rm wages and employment then, if b has a negative
probability limit in the cross section it also has a negative limit in the entire panel. Therefore
if the su¢ cient conditions on k(k) for (asymptotic) negativity of b discussed in subsections
4.2,4.3 and 4.4 above hold in both the high and low sectors, this is all we need consider. We
now turn to analyse the e¤ects of random sampling on our results.
4.8 The e¤ects of using a random sample
Until now we have assumed that we have access to a complete dataset of all the workers in
an economy with a large number of rms. But investigators typically only have access to a
random subsample.of a particular population (a remarkable exception is the QPdataset in
the case of Portugal). The e¤ects of random sampling add technicalities but provided that
the number of rms being sampled remains large the probability limits of the estimates are
unchanged.
Suppose we have a random sample consisting of a proportion jt of rm j0s workforce at
time t where jt equals a constant  > 0 plus an independently distributed nite variance
shock "jt. so that
Ljt k = Ljt k + "jt kLjt k and (23)
Lt = Lt +
nX
j=1
"jtLjt (24)
where superscript  denotes a quantity from a random sample so that Ljt k{L

tg are the
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number of workers sampled ex post from rm j at time t  kftg.18.
Proposition 3:- The asymptotic quantities computed in this paper for the
entire population of workers in n rms are unchanged if we have instead a random
sample with properties given in(23) and (24)
Proof:- See appendix
5 Some numerical simulations
Here we analyse the values of b from calibrated versions of two models. The main purpose is
to be indicative rather than exhaustive. We wish to show that under reasonable parameter
values, equal treatment models are capable of generating UTI e¤ects of a similar order of
magnitude as those found in the empirical literature.
The rst equal treatment model we use is one of labour contracting under exogenous real
wage rigidity due to Martins, Snell and Thomas (2010) which we call MST. The second is a
standard textbook model of dynamic labour demand in a multisectoral competitive frame-
work which we call DCM. Although competitive, the DCM can be interpreted equivalently
as a model of dynamic (labour) monopsony because as MSTa show, the stochastic structures
for each sectors wages and employment in DCM is identical to that of each rm in the
monopsony model.
The MST and DCM models do not have rms but sectors (although if we interpret the
DCM model as one of monopsony, the sectors would be considered as being rms). Sectors
are presumed to be segmented labour markets. Whilst it is not clear how many such labour
markets exist in any economy, their number will be an order of magnitude lower than that of
rms. In the face of this uncertainty we run simulations for numbers of sectors ns = 9,21.and
51 The frequency is assumed to be annual with the number of years, T , in the panel set to
5,10 and 20 - typical spans for many US panel data studies.
The MST Model.
Martins, Snell and Thomas (2010) give an equal treatment model where real wages are
assumed to be downwardly rigid.in that, the maximum amount per period they can fall
is exogenously bounded. If we specify that the maximum rate of real wage decline is the
18We note four things. First, we should more formally write Lrjt k = int(jt kLjt k) where int denotes
integer truncation but doing so changes nothing so we suppress this for brevity. Second, our assumptions on
" do not rule out jt = 0 for some rm j - the crucial assumption is that its mean  is strictly positve and
constant and remains so as n  > 1. Third and in the proof of the proposotion, wjt is written without a
 superscript because it pertains to rm j and is not changed by random sampling. Finally allowing jt to
be stochastic means that the sample is not stratied with respect to rms but obvioulsy the stratied case
- where the variance of errors goes to zero, is encompassed here.
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ination rate then this model becomes one of absolute nominal wage rigidity. The two
equations describing wage-price dynamics are a wage equals MPL condition and a wage
adjustment rule. We assume these are given by respectively
MPLjt = wjt = K + jt   ljt (25)
wjt = maxfjt; wjt 1g (26)
where   1. Following a large negative productivity shock, wages fall only slowly to
the new market clearing level at a rate determined by  which is assumed to be exogenous.
We choose this model for our simulations because it has so few parameters and because as
MST show, it ts the postwar US data on unemployment and wages quite well. We split
the articial economy into high and low sub-economies as described above. For the MST
model we adopt a more general rm productivity process than before, one that includes both
idiosyncratic (rm or sector specic) and aggregate shocks, namely
jt = t+ "jt + t (27)
t = t 1 + t (28)
where "jt and t are iid normally distributed rm specic and aggregate (log) productivity
shocks with variances 2" and 
2
 respectively and where .jt is the log of the total factor
productivity (TFP) of sector j at time t. Given this productivity process, MST will generate
genuine business cycles in wages and unemployment.
Unfortunately there is no data on sectoral TFP for the MST model to help us calibrate
values for 2" . However the Bureau for Labour Statistics does produce TFP estimates for
20 or so manufacturing sectors. The postwar standard deviations of TFP growth in these
sectors lie between 2 and 5% - substantially higher than that for aggregate TFP as one might
expect.given that the sectors will in part be driven by idiosyncratic elements. We therefore
run two sets of simulations with " = :02 and " = :05:respectively. This should give us an
idea of how E(b) changes with idiosyncratic TFP volatility. When ns is large, idiosyncratic
shocks will wash out and the standard deviation of aggregate productivity growth will be
 In postwar annual US data, this quantity is roughly :017. By setting ".to :015 we get
a standard deviation of aggregate productivity growth slightly below :017 for large ns and
slightly above for small ns. The parameter , the inverse of the sector wage elasticity of
labour demand is set to 1:4, roughly in line with results from studies of labour demand using
postwar US data. The extent to which real wages can fall within any year () we set to :97.
If ination stands at 3% per annum - close to the postwar US average - than this setting
implies downward nominal wage rigidity (for a recent model of nominal wage rigidity see
Elsby, 2010). The trend term  is set to :01 implying 1% per year growth in real wages.
Finally we have two separate scenarios:- the rst has a single economy with homogenous
sectoral means and retention rates and the second allocates the sectors into high and low
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sub-economies as per section 3. In the latter exercise, sectors in the high sub-economy
have twice the mean employment and 5% higher wages than the low sub economy.and the
retention rates for each sub-economy were :8 and :6 respectively We kept the total size of
each subeconomy equal by allowing the low sub-economy to have twice as many sectors as
the high. In each simulation the wage-size premium is about 5% in keeping with elasticities
estimated in the empirical literature for rms - the implicit assumption being therefore that
rms in high sectors are twice the size of those in low sectors. By having results for the two
subeconomies and for a single (single s) economy we are able to assess the e¤ect heterogenous
mean wages and retention rates have on the parameter estimates.
The DCM Model
The DCM model is intrinsically a "deviations from trend" model and wages here are in
levels not logs. Firms in each sector j determine employment to maximise discounted prots
subject to a quadratic cost of new hires.and to sectoral labour supply and to productivity
shocks. The reduced form equations for sectoral employment and wages are
Ljt = Ljt 1 +

cs
fjt + ujtg (29)
Wjt = Wjt 1 +
  2cs
cs
ujt + 2ujt 1 +

cs
jt (30)
where c is a parameter determining hiring costs, s is the (common) sectoral labour retention
rate,  = cs
1+c+cs(s ) with  being the discount rate, t is an aggregate(common) productivity
shock and where ujt are idiosyncratic shocks to sector js labour supply (see MSTa).
The standard deviation of t is  = :025 and the standard deviation of ujt is set at a
level that makes the standard deviation of aggregate (detrended) employment equal to 2%
- roughly in line with postwar US data. The model is linear and aggregates so  is the
AR(1) coe¢ cient in aggregate wages and employment. We set it to :6 again in line with
postwar aggregate employment and wage data. The parameter c is set to 2 which implies
equilibrium labour turnover costs are around 8% of the wage bill - roughly in line with
estimates given by Mincer(1989). The retention rate.s is set to :7, roughly in line with the
average for US rms. Finally the discount rate  is set to :98; a value typically used in
macroeconomic analyses undertaken at the annual frequency.Under these parameter values
the model naturally exhibits a positive wage-size premium.(see MSTa) and so we do not
adopt the high-low subeconomy structure for this model.
The Simulation Results
We derive average values for bminu;. bSu; and b@u using 1000 simulations for each model
and parameter set. We add one further estimate beu which uses the de-meaned aggregate
unemployment rate ut  
PT
t=1 ut
T
to construct u rather than the unemployment level itself.
We do this because we believe it is a more satisfactory way of modeling the impact of
unemployment on wages in that allows for an arbitrary scale of ut.In keeping with the
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empirical literature we include a linear tenure term in all regressions and for the bu case we
add the aggregate unemployment rate as an extra regressor.
Results for the MST model under a single economy (Table 1) and two sub-economies
(Table 2) and for the DCM model (Table 3) are given below
Table 1
Estimates of E(b) for the MST Model without high/low subeconomies
" = :02 " = :05bminu bu beu bSu bminu bu beu bSu
ns = 9; T = 5  2:05  1:82  2:50  :43  :57  :29  :71  :13
ns = 21; T = 5  2:42  2:07  2:95  :51  :64  :23  :61  :10
ns = 51; T = 5  3:44  2:88  4:46  :66  :65  :22  :70  :13
ns = 9; T = 9  2:12  1:88  2:36  :49  :63  :29  :63  :17
ns = 21; T = 9  3:06  2:54  3:48  :70  :63  :22  :60  :14
ns = 51; T = 9  3:28  2:39  3:39  :85  :86  :22  :77  :21
ns = 9; T = 20  1:98  1:57  1:95  :77  :50  :20  :37  :15
ns = 21; T = 20  2:77  2:13  2:82  :90  :75  :20  :50  :22
ns = 51; T = 20  3:30  2:32  3:15  1:09
Table 2
Estimates of E(b) for the MST Model with high/low sub-economies
" = :02 " = :05bminu bu beu bSu bminu bu beu bSu
ns = 10; T = 5  2:11  2:16  :83  :45  1:06  :79  :87  :12
ns = 20; T = 5  3:61  3:46  2:11  :59  :99  :73  :88  :12
ns = 50; T = 5  4:79  4:69  3:02  :61  :96  :75  :74  :11
ns = 10; T = 10  3:35  3:10  2:30  :69  :79  :55  :51  :14
ns = 20; T = 10  4:16  3:80  3:10  :75  1:03  :65  :70  :19
ns = 50; T = 10  5:12  4:74  3:62  :79  1:33  :77  :89  :24
ns = 10; T = 20  3:20  2:92  2:27  :80  :88  :55  :45  :16
ns = 20; T = 20  4:09  3:52  2:92  :99  1:18  :62  :58  :22
ns = 50; T = 20  5:44  4:64  3:95  1:34  1:41  :77  :72  :26
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Table 3
Estimates of E(b) for the DMC Model
DMC bminu bu beu bSu
u = :02 u = :01
ns = 9; T = 5  :997  :008  :128  :302
ns = 21; T = 5  :963  :007  :100  :286
ns = 51; T = 5  :978  :007  :112  :296
ns = 9; T = 10  :913  :007  :145  :318
ns = 21; T = 10  :947  :009  :151  :330
ns = 51; T = 10  :991  :008  :153  :328
ns = 9; T = 20  :923  :012  :184  :387
ns = 21; T = 20  :966  :012  :180  :390
ns = 51; T = 20  :988  :012  :187  :412
We see that all estimates have a negative sign In terms of magnitude the minu and Su
estimates in MST for low idiosyncratic variance are similar to those obtained by BDN. The
estimates of u in this scenario are higher in absolute value than empirical counterparts.
MST estimates from the high " case are in line with empirical counterparts for Su and u
but those for minu are a bit low.compared with the values found in the empirical literature.
DCM seems to produce estimates for Su that are broadly in line with empirical work but
the results for minu and u are lower than that typically found. By comparing the numbers
in Tables 1 and 2 we can see that the high/low subeconomy structure appears to increase
the estimates in absolute value and considerably so in many cases. Finally we report that
although all regressions included a linear tenure term, the addition of this term had minimal
impact.on the estimates.
6 Extending SBPmethod to handle unmatched datasets
The problem of bias we have identied in this paper has its root in rm (or sector) specic
components of the wage that are related to rm (or sector) hiring levels. As noted above
we could remove these by adding rm-year interaction dummies to the panel regression.
Under an equal treatment model as laid out in (3) this would reduce the regressand wijt to
idiosyncratic noise whereas under the hypothesis that wages are linear in cijt the addition of
such dummy terms is innocuous. But what if the dataset does not match workers to rms?
Large matched panel datasets abound in Europe but in the US they are virtually non-
existent. In this section we tentatively o¤er a solution to the bias which is implementable
in unmatched datasets. The solution is considerably inferior to the addition of rm-year
interaction terms and will only work if cross rm wage-employment covariances are constant
over time.
SBP point out that in a panel data set, macro variates like unemployment, have extremely
limited variation. For example, adding the aggregate unemployment rate to a Mincer equa-
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tion in the PSID involves dealing with a regressor that takes on <50 di¤erent values to
explain wages which take on around a million di¤erent values. As Moulton(1990) shows,
this is likely to impart huge bias to standard errors because of error clustering. SBPs solu-
tion was to use the panel dimension to control for worker characteristics and extract from
the panel "composition bias free" estimates of mean wages at each time t via the addition
to the Mincer equation of time dummies. Coe¢ cients on these dummies - common time
e¤ects in wages - would then be regressed on unemployment and other macro series of in-
terest in a time series regression. In an extension of this idea to minu and Su, Devereux
and Hart(2007) add tenure-year interaction dummies to extract composition bias free esti-
mates of average wages within each tenure-year cell of the panel data. Minu and Su only
vary between tenure-year cells and are constant for workers within these cells. So again the
idea is to condense the data to guarantee that the "x-variable" varies between each data
point. Finally Shin and Shin(2003) extract time means of respectively, stayersand movers
wages to estimate di¤erential e¤ects of unemployment on new hires and incumbent wages
via separate time series regressions. We show below that these aggregation methods do not
remove the bias we have identied in this paper but they do point to a possible way forward
to remove it.
Again and without loss of generality, we abstract from worker characteristics so we can
focus on raw mean wages. In this section we operate under the hypothesis of equal treatment
as written in equations (3) and (5) above. We maintain the high/low rm structure above
with high/low mean wages, high/low mean employment and high/low retention rates and
where each rm is subject to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. Under this scenario the
tenure k time t average (log) wage is
wkt =
nhP
j=1
skh(L
h
jt k   shLhjt k 1)whjt +
nlP
j=1
skl (L
l
jt k   slLljt k 1)wljt
nhP
j=1
skh(L
h
jt k   shLhjt k 1) +
nlP
j=1
skl (L
l
jt k   slLljt k 1)
(31)
where Lijt k i = h; l is employment in a rm j at time t   k that is located in the i
sector and where ni i = h; l is the number of rms in sector i..assumed xed over time.
Dening the proportion of rms in the high/low sectors as a xed constant pi = n
i
n
, dividing
the top and bottom of (31) by n and taking probability limits as the ni both go to innity
gives p limwkt (= k;t) as
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where it =
Pni
j=1 w
i
jt
ni
and L
h
t k are the (unweighted) average rm wage at t and rm
employment(size) at t  k in the i sector.respectively and where ik;t is the probability limit
of the sample covariance of Ljt k and wjt. We make two further simplifying assumptions.
First we assume that L
l
t k = L
h
t k ( < 1) i.e. that employment in the high and low sectors
has common cyclicality.19 Second we assume that the normalised covariances ik;t =
ik;t
L
i
t kit
are constant over time and henceforth drop the t subscript. Under these assumptions (32)
takes the form
k;t = 
h
t +
ak   ak+1kt   (bk   bk+1kt)wpt
ck   ck+1kt (33)
where ak = p
hskh
h
k + p
lskl 
l
k ck = p
hskh + p
lskl and bk = p
lskl
where kt = L
h
t k 1=L
h
t k. Under a constant or slow moving labour supply, kt is approx-
imately one plus the change in the aggregate unemployment rate at time t   k.and as it
only enters tenure k0s cell mean it is the same as the change in the "start unemployment
rate". Equation (33) shows that under equal treatment, average wages in the tenure-year
cells k;t will, in general, vary with tenure and time. In fact even if wages were equal across
rms.(ik = 0 and 
i
t = ):as long as employment was cyclical, cell mean wages would still
display cyclical variation over time and tenure. The SBP method20 uses wkt to estimate 
h
k;t.
We then regress wkt (which form a balanced panel dataset) on the relevant cell value of the
UTI, ckt say. In the case of u; k takes the value 0 for new hires and 1 for all other tenures
(incumbents) and there are two regressors; ukt and ut. We consider the consequences of
using the SBP method for each of our three UTIs in turn.
a) Su :   Equation (32) shows that under equal treatment hk;t will be related to the
19This assumption would hold true if each rms employment was linear in idiosyncratic shocks and in
aggregate shocks.with the latter entering with coe¢ cient () in high(low) rms. We should note that
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay, (2008) nd that "high" rms (large rms with high average wages) have more
cyclical employment than do "low" rms. We make the assumption of common cyclicality to simplify matters
but it shouild be clear from the discussion that greater cyclicality of high rms would make our results even
more pronounced.
20More properly its extension in Devereux and Hart (2007).
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change in start unemployment. Hence Su will be signicant both under bilateral contracting
of the Su variety.and when there is equal treatment.
b) minu :   Again problems arise here because of potential comovement of minu with
wkt over t and k:under equal treatment. To give a specic and simple example we could
return temporarily to the base scenario of this paper and suppose that aggregate shocks are
absent so that mean wages and mean rm employment at time t are constant21. Economic
models of wage determination lead us to expect that the jhk;tj will decline with k albeit not
necessarily monotically 22. Equally we know that minu will decline with k although again
not necessarily monotonically. If the hk;t are predominantly negative we would expect a
spuriously negative coe¢ cient in the regression of wkt on the t; k.cell minu.
c) u :   The SBP method has been used several times in the empirical literature to
estimate the di¤erential response of new hire wages to unemployment so we now esh out
more explicit results for this case. The mean wage of incumbents (It) is
It = p lim
nhP
j=1
shL
h
jt 1w
h
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nlP
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slL
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sl
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where  = pl=ph is the ratio of the number of workers in low rms to those in high
rms in the economy as a whole. Adapting (32) with k = 0 to get the corresponding case
for new hires gives
0t = 
h
t +
a0   a1kt   (b0   b10t)wpt
c0   c10t (35)
Equations (34) and (35) show that the mean incumbent and new hire wages are both
weighted averages of the 0ts but the former has xed weights whereas the latter has weights
that vary with 0t.(approximately one plus the change in the current unemployment rate).
An interesting special case is where wages in rms are acyclical - constant to make this an
extreme case - but where aggregate employment is cyclical. Linearising the second term in
(35) around 0t = 1 we can rewrite (35) as
21As before we would require aggregate labour supply to vary over time in order to avoid a constant
aggregate unemployment rate).
22In dynamic models, the 0ks will be non zero because current and lagged idiosyncratic shocks a¤ect rm
wages and rm employment. These models usually embed stationarity guaranteeing that the 0s  > 0 with
k:
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0t  cons tan t  
(sh   sl)wp
(1  sh + (1  sl))2 (0t   1) = + t 1 (36)
where  < 0. As noted above 0t   1 is approximately the change in the aggregate
unemployment rate. Unlike It therefore, 0t would appear to be procyclical and regressing
fIt,0tg on the aggregate unemployment rate and a new hire dummy times the unem-
ployment rate (U) would yield a zero coe¢ cient on the former but a spuriously negative
coe¢ cient on the latter.23
As a nal note and in contrast to the above, if we again assume common cyclicality of
employment in the high and low sectors, we can show that wages averaged over all workers
at time t (t) do not display spurious cyclicality under a null of equal treatment. Using
L
l
t k = L
h
t k; k = 0; 1; 2:: and following familiar arithmetic manipulations it is easy to show
that t is given by
t =
1
1 + 
(1 + h0 )
h
t +

1 + 
(1 + l0 )
l
t (37)
where 1
1+ and where

1+ are proportions of the workforce in low and high rms re-
spectively. Hence, whilst (32) to (36) show how mean wages at time t for tenure k will in
general display spurious cyclicality and spurious tenure e¤ects (37) shows that - under our
simplifying assumptions,- average wages across all workers (tenures) at time t will not. If
T was large the investigator could regress composition bias free estimates of t on cijt. (to
capture the alternative hypothesis) and on presumed determinants of it such as u and trend
(to capture the null). The signicance (and "correct" sign) of cijt would favour the alter-
native hypothesis of the UTI in question. However very often T is too small to get reliable
estimates this way and in any event, ignoring cross tenure variation in wages will severly
reduce power under the alternative.
6.1 Adapting the SBP method:- An empirical illustration
SBP obtain composition bias free estimates of mean wages for each relevant tenure category.
For minu and Su this means using the panel dimension to control for worker characteristics
and averaging the residual wages in each tenure-time cell to obtain estimates of the kt .
These are then regressed on the relevant cell value of cijt.(ckt) (see for example Devereux and
Hart,2007) .However as argued above, equation (32) shows how this may lead to spurious
results. To eliminate this possibility, we suggest adding extra regressors to absorb the terms
in (32) i.e. those terms that would appear if our equal treatment model held true. Taking
the simplifying assumptions of the previous section on board again here (constant normalised
23This is a relatively simple result to derive and proof is available on request.
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covariances and equal cyclicality of employment in high and low rms) it is easy to show
that we can linearise (32) to get
k;t ' ak + bkt + ckut k (38)
where t is a weighted average of ht and 
l
t. If we further assume that t is driven by
a deterministic trend (t) and by aggregate unemployment (ut) we could regress (estimates
of) k;t on t,ut,.ut k; ckt and on tenure dummies allowing coe¢ cients on all but the last
two to di¤er across tenures. Another way of viewing this procedure is to see it as a set of k
regression equations, one for each tenure subject to the cross equation restriction of a single
common coe¢ cient on ckt. We call this the modied SBP method (MSBP). To apply it we
rst of all need to use the panel dimension to factor out worker composition e¤ects from k;t:
Our empirical model may be summarised as
wijt = r0xijt + ijt + cijt + wjt + vijt (39)
where cov(wjt; xijt) = 0
H0 :  = 0 H1 < 0
where xijt is a ax1 vector of worker characteristics such as educational attainment (it
may also include worker xed e¤ect dummies), ijt is worker tenure and vijt is an idiosyn-
cratic error term independent of all the RHS varaiables. As before wjt is an unobserved
rm j specic component of wages that will in general contain aggregate variates such as
unemployment and a time trend as well as idiosyncratic components such as rm specic
productivity shocks. The way the hypotheses are set up allows rm specic wage compo-
nents wjt to exist under H1. As noted in the introduction to this paper it is quite likely
that several contracting mechanisms simultaneously co-exist in a large economy in di¤erent
sectors. Alternatively wages within a sector or rm may have a rm specic component
and a di¤erential tenure related business cycle component.Equations (34),35 and (36) above
suggest that it may be impossible to reject the existence of rm specic wage components
in unmatched datasets.
Under the assumptions in (39) we can obtain consistent estimates of r under both null
and alternative by executing the OLS regression
wijt = r0xijt +
X
k
X
t
k;t@
k
ijt + eijt (40)
where @kijt is unity if the worker is of tenure k at time t. and zero otherwise. The tk
estimates of k;t (bk;t) provide us with composition-free wage means for each k; t cell to be
used in the second stage regression.
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To illustrate this procedure and to get a handle on what di¤erence it may make in US
panel data we collected an unbalanced panel dataset from the PSID. for the years 1976
to 1993. This is a period which nests the years selected by BDN (1976-84) and which
displays much time series volatility (an oil price shock and two major recessions) We collected
information on workersreal log wages (real 1983 $ using the CPI deator), occupation (7
categories), education (7 categories), State of residence, age, tenure (in years) and race
(white, Hispanic, and other). Despite di¤erences between our data collection and that of
BDN 24 our panel estimates for minu; Su and u for the subsample in 1976-84 (the BDN
years) are close to that obtained by BDN as rows 1. to 6. in Table 4 show. Extending the
data to 1993 and more than doubling the number of observations makes little qualitative
di¤erence as lines 7. to 9. show although the estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute
value here. Adding year e¤ects - there is a negative trend in aggregate wages during this
period - does not change the sign or nominal 25 signicance of the estimates.Finally all
coe¢ cients on characteristics were correctly signed and had reasonable orders of magnitude.
When it came to implementing the MSBP method.we encountered some problems At
large tenures, some tenure/year (k; t) cells were empty and some others contained too few
observations to give reliable estimates of wage means. To avoid null or sparsely populated
cells we computed cell means for 9 tenure categories - tenures 0 to 8 and a nal category
consisting of all tenures in excess of 8 years. Table 5 gives the SBP and MSBP estimates
for the 1976-93 sample. Lines 1 and 2 show the results for the regression of bk;t on trend,
tenure and minu and on trend, tenure and Su respectively: Minu and Su have "correct"
sign but only the former is signicant. This is in keeping with results in the literature where
minu has been consistently found to be negative and siginicant in a variety of datasets and
specications whereas success with Su.has been mixed.
Using (38) as a guide we add extra regressors to purge the regresssion error of terms
whose presence is induced by the existence of equal treatment wage components. Explicitly
we add ut and ktut (k = 0; 1; ::8); t and ktt (k = 0; 1::::8); ktut k(k = 0; 1:::9) and
kt(k = 0; 1::9): where kt is a dummy variable indicating tenure k. Lines 3 and 4 show that
adding these terms reduces minu to being wholly insignicant and both Su and minu now
take the wrong sign. The two Wald tests (available on request) on the 8 ktut.terms and on
the 8 kt terms respectively were wholly insiginicant. However these terms turned out to
be highly collinear and a test for joint signicance of all 16 of them had a p-value below 1%.
The shortage of degrees of freedom inhibit applying this method rigorously to the BDN
years (37 regressors but only 81 observations) but for completenesssake we report the results
for this subsample anyway in lines 5 to 8. Asymptotic inference is unreliable here but the
24Tenure was taken directly from answers to the question relating to "present employer". By contrast
BDN employ the algorithm of Altonji and Shakotko(1987) to modify the raw tenure data. However they
argue it made little di¤erence to their results. We also note that average tenure from our data for the
relevant subsample is within 5% of BDNs. BDN also have 13 industrial sectors, marital status and union
membership. They also add worker xed e¤ects but their results show that these have little qualititative
impact on their results.
25The word nominal is used because of the Moulton problem.
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results do seem to be qualititatively similar.to those in the larger sample.
Before closing we note two more things. First, the ktut k terms were signicant (29
values of 22:4 and 21:9 in the minu and Su regressions respectively) and this is quite in-
tereresting. Whilst there may be stories to support existence for tenure varying trends and
intercepts (for example a complex rewards to tenure scheme), the existence of tenure varying
responses to the change in initial unemployment (ut k) is hard to rationalise using eco-
nomic arguments. Second, and by contrast, there is an obvious caveat to this procedure.
Tenure related terms added to the regression will soak up a lot of the cross tenure variation
in minu and Su. In short the method undermines the power of tests under the alternative
that minu adn Su do actually determine wages. This brings us back to the point made
earlier in the paper that the rst best solution to the problem is to purge wijt of any rm
specic wage components via the addition of rm-year interaction dummies to the original
panel.
Table 4
Panel estimates of Minu,Su and u from the PSID
u Su Minu
BDN 1976-84 (N=19958)
1.  :020 (:002)
2.  :030 (:002)
3.  :045 (:003)
MST 1976-84 (N=19749)
4.  :023 (:002)
5.  :025 (:002)
6.  :054 (:003)
1976-93Panel (N=46057)
7.  :010 (:011)
8.  :017 (:001)
9.  :033 (:016)
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Table 5
Estimates26 from the PSID using BSP and MBSP.
Su Minu  t
SBP 1976-1993 (N=162)
1.  :015 (:006) :015 (:002)  :015 (:001)
2.  :003 (:059) :017 (:001)  :015 (:001)
MSBP 1976-1993 (N=162)
3. :001 (:013)
4.  :005 (:007)
N=162
SBP 1976-1984 (N=81)
5.  :046 (:008) :005 (:002)  :004 (:003)
6.  :025 (:008) :012 (:002)  :008 (:004)
MSBP 1976-1984 (N=81)
7. :007 (:027)
8. :002 (:012)
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Proof of Proposition 1:-
Note that in a single complete cross section the number of observations is the labour
force at time t, Lt. Using this, the numerator in (5) is
scov(wijt; cijt) =
1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
wijtcijt  
0@ 1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
wijt
1A0@ 1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
cijt
1A (A1)
We can substitute (3) into the RHS of (A1) to get
scov(wijt; cijt) =
1
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j=1
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i=1
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1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
vijtcijt  
0@ 1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
vijt
1A0@ 1
Lt
nX
j=1
LjtX
i=1
cijt
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Lt
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j=1
cjt + op(1)
(A3)
where cjt =
LjtX
i=1
cijt and where the op(1) terms derive from the fact that the v0s are
idiosyncratic and that Lt goes to 1 with n:
scov(wijt; cijt) =
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=
1
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scovf (wjt; cjt)  scovf (Ljt; wjt): 1
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nX
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cjt
!
+ op(1)
which establishes (6) in the text.
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It follows from this that the time t averages of wages (wt) are
wt =
1
Lt
nP
j=1
LjtP
i=1
wijt =
1
Lt
 
1
n
nP
j=1
Ljtwjt
!
Again allowing n the number of rms to go to innity gives us the probability limiit.27
p limwt =
0
L
+ w
where w = p lim( 1n
nP
j=1
wjt).and as before 0 = p lim scovf (wjt; Ljt).
In general then wages would vary from rm to rm as would employment. In aggregate
however and in a large economy, employment and average wages at time t - whether measured
across rms or across a sample of individuals working at those rms - are constant over time.
28
We focus on b = 1
svarp(cijt)
(scovp(wijt; cijt)) with i = 1:::Ljt; j = 1::::n and t = 1; :::T ..
The superscript p denotes a sample covariance from full panel. As before we are only inter-
ested in the sign of b so we can focus on the p lim of the numerator alone.
We can always write a sample covariance over T time periods as a weighted average of
the within time covariances plus "across time" covariances i.e.
scovp(wijt; cijt) 
TX
t=1
ptscov(wijt; cijt) +
TX
t=1
pt(wt   w)(ct   c) (A7)
where w = 1
N
TP
t=1
nP
j=1
LjtP
i=1
wijt.is the average wage in the entire panel, pt = LtN
29 is the pro-
portion of panel observations (N) occurring at time t. Our assumption for wages implies
that
27Note that we assume the number of rms is constant across time. This is purely to save notation.
It would not change anything if we allowed the number of rms to vary over time and instead based a
probability limit on nmin = min(n1; n2:::nT )  > 1. Similarly allowing rm composition to change across
time would merely increase notation: - All workers are identical and rms only di¤er in that each has its
own wage driven by an idiosyncratic shock(s).
28As we have already noted we require some movement in aggregate labour supply over time as a device
to generate some variation in minu and Su over individual workers in the panel.
29Note that p lim pt = 1T so panel sample covariances are the simple unweighted average of their cross
sectional counterparts.
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p limwt = p limw t = 1; ::T
Under these assumptions the second term in (A7) vanishes asymptotically and (21) and (22)
in the text directly follow.
Proof of Proposition 3
We show the result for bminu. Adaptation of the analysis below to u, Su and to sample
means computed in Section 7 is obvious and straightforward and is available on request.
The numerator of bminu for a random sample from a single cross section at time t can be
found via a simple adaptation of (13) namely
Numerator(bminu) =   1
L

t
1X
k=1
sk(fk  
Lt k
Lt
f0 )(u
m
t k+1   umt k) (A8)
The assumptions in (23) and (24) imply that
p lim(L

t ) = Lt
p lim fk = p limfscovf (Ljt k; wjt)g+ p limfscovf ("jt kLjt k; wjt)g = k
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Lt k
Lt
= p lim
Lt k=n
Lt =n
=
Lt k
Lt
Using these three probability limits in (A8) we see that the numerator in bminu is asymp-
totically unchanged by random sampling.
For the denominator we have
Denominator(bminu) = 1Lt =n
8<:
nX
j=1
LjtX
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minu2ijt=n
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
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=
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
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fB=n g2
We can expand the terms A and B by adapting (11) in the text to get
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This shows that both terms in the denominator (A and B) are weighted sums of "head
counts" of workers of di¤erent tenures surviving within rm j. They are therefore linear
in
nP
j=1
Ljt k.k = 0; 1::Note also that setting  = 1 in the above expressions gives us the
corresponding formulae for the full sample. Using (23) and (24) and taking probability
limits gives
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Taking probability limits of (A9), using p lim( 1
Lt =n
) = 1

p lim( 1
Lt=n
):therein and using
(A10) and (A11) gives a new form for (A9) as
p limfDenominator(bminu)g = p limf 1Lt =ng:p limfA=ng  

p limf 1
Lt =n
g:p limfB=ng
2
= p lim(
1
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
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g:p limfB1=ng
2
= p limfDenominator(b1minu)g
where again we have used b1minu to denote the estimate based on the full sample.
This establishes the Proposition.
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